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Equality at Stake: Connecting the Privacy/Vulnerability Cycle
to the Debate about Publicly Accessible Online Court Records
By Jacquelyn Burkell and Jane Bailey**

A considerable amount has been written about the privacy implications of publishing court and
tribunal records online. In this article the authors examine the linkages between privacy and
vulnerability for members of marginalized communities and, drawing on Calo’s “vicious cycle”
of privacy and vulnerability, suggest that publicly accessible online court records represent an
equality issue as well. Drawing on social science research and privacy theory, the authors
demonstrate the potentially disproportionate effect of online court records on members of
marginalized communities. They then examine Canadian case law, legislation and policy that
impose restrictions on public disclosure of information from court proceedings and disclosure of
information within court proceedings to highlight a limited pre-existing recognition of the
privacy/vulnerability cycle. In conclusion they suggest that removal of personal information from
court records made publicly available online would serve to protect both privacy and equality
rights.
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I.

Introduction

Court and tribunal records from around the world are increasingly publicly accessible online.
These initiatives offer, as we and others have noted, ground-shifting opportunities for improved
access to justice and for the transparency of court proceedings; however, they simultaneously
raise serious privacy issues for those involved, willingly or unwillingly, in those proceedings.2 In
this article we explore the complex and iterative relationship, characterized in the epigraph by
Calo, between publicly accessible, unredacted, online court records and marginalization,
vulnerability and inequality. Specifically, we suggest that members of equality-seeking
communities stand to be disproportionately negatively affected by online publication of court
records incorporating personal information. In this way, online court records constitute not only a
privacy problem, but an equality problem as well. This further dimension adds urgency to the
need for privacy and equality-respecting approaches to online publication of court and tribunal
records.
We advance our argument in Parts II and III. Part II examines literature and social
science evidence relating to privacy and vulnerability, suggesting that members of marginalized
Ryan Calo, “Privacy, Vulnerability, and Affordance” (2017) 66:2 DePaul Law Review 591 at 597.
Jane Bailey & Jacquelyn Burkell, “Revisiting the Open Court Principle in an Era of Online Publication:
Questioning Presumptive Public Access to Parties’ and Witnesses’ Personal Information” (2017) 48:1
Ottawa Law Review 147; Natalie A MacDonnell, “Disability Disclosure in the Digital Age: Why the
Human Rights Tribunal of Ontario Should Reform its Approach to Anonymized Decisions” (2016) 25:1
Journal of Law and Social Policy 109; Karen Eltis, Courts, Litigants and the Digital Age: Law, Ethics and
Practice (Toronto: Irwin Law, 2012) at 5.
1
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communities in Canada, including poor and homeless persons, those suffering from mental
illness, racialized minorities and Indigenous peoples, will be disproportionately negatively
affected by publicly accessible online court records. Drawing on Calo’s “vicious cycle” analogy,
we offer three reasons in support of this assertion: (i) members of certain marginalized
communities are over-represented in many types of court proceedings; (ii) the impacts of
marginalization may force members of these communities to engage with the justice system; and
(iii) potentially stigmatizing information about these individuals in court records renders them
vulnerable to increased discrimination and other kinds of harms. Part III looks at the degree to
which Canadian law has recognized and responded to the privacy/vulnerability cycle in relation
to court and tribunal records. After examining court rulings about publication bans and rules
relating to disclosure within proceedings, this section specifically examines privacy protections
afforded to certain vulnerable groups, including children, sexual assault complainants (who are
disproportionately likely to be women) and persons with disabilities, as well as public
commentary relating to online publication of court records. Some of these decisions and
commentators implicitly or explicitly recognize the privacy/vulnerability cycle that connects a
lack of privacy with exposure to inequality and discrimination, thereby offering at least some
analysis that can be used to support removing personal information from publicly accessible
online court records. The conclusion recommends a response that disrupts the “vicious cycle”
without presuming or suggesting that members of equality-seeking communities must or ought to
conceal certain information about themselves.

II.

Examination of the Privacy/Vulnerability Cycle in the Literature

Jeffrey Rosen, in The Unwanted Gaze, noted that “[t]he ideal of privacy … insists that individuals
should be allowed to define themselves, and to decide how much of themselves to reveal or

conceal in different situations”.3 Rosen’s remarks are echoed in Nissenbaum’s concept of
information privacy as “contextual integrity”.4 According to Nissenbaum, privacy violations
occur when personal information is used in ways that are incompatible with norms of appropriate
use and appropriate distribution.5 The ability to control the use and dissemination of information
about oneself is important. Intimate relationships depend on a delicate interplay between
concealment and disclosure.6 Privacy offers us personal autonomy, and supports important social
values including democracy.7 While it can and has been used to shield abuse of members of
equality-seeking groups from public scrutiny and censure,8 it can also afford members of
equality-seeking groups, including women, opportunities for “replenishing solitude and
independent decision making,” as well as freedom from censure, surveillance and pressures of
conformity.9 Everyone, including members of equality-seeking groups, needs – and deserves –
privacy.

A.

Privacy and Vulnerability

Nonetheless, there are many cases in which privacy is closely, and negatively, tied to
vulnerability and marginalization. Economic marginalization and lack of privacy go hand in hand.
Some have argued that privacy is becoming a “luxury good”,10 available primarily to those who
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Jeffrey Rosen, The Unwanted Gaze: The Destruction of Privacy in America (New York: Vintage Books,
2000) at 223.
4
Helen Nissenbaum, “Privacy as Contextual Integrity” (2004) 79:1 Washington Law Review 119.
5
Ibid at 125.
6
Sandra Petronio & Irwin Altman, Boundaries of Privacy: Dialectics of Disclosure (Albany: State
University of New York Press, 2002).
7
Nissenbaum, supra note 4 at 128-29.
8
Catharine MacKinnon, Toward a Feminist Theory of the State (Massachusetts: Harvard University Press,
1989) at 191.
9
Anita L Allen, Uneasy Access: Privacy for Women in a Free Society (New York: Rowman and Littlefield,
1988) at 1183. See also Patricia J Williams, The Alchemy of Race and Rights: Diary of a Law Professor
(Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1991) at 164-65
10
Julia Angwin, “Has Privacy Become a Luxury Good?”, The New York Times (3 March 2014), online: NY
Times <www.nytimes.com/2014/03/04/opinion/has-privacy-become-a-luxury-good.html>.

can afford to pay to achieve it.11 This is particularly true online, where ‘free’ services are in fact
purchased with the currency of personal information, and the price of freedom from online
surveillance is paid in cash – either by use of services hidden behind “paywalls”, or through the
purchase of privacy-protecting technologies and software. Those living in poverty can afford
neither, and as a result cannot benefit from the privacy protection that these purchases support. In
the United States, many have argued that Fourth Amendment protection is reduced for the poor,12
specifically because they are less able to afford to buy homes.13 Although the issue has not been
widely addressed in Canada, some empirical research suggests that homeless people’s contacts
with law often involve invasion of their section 8 rights under the Canadian Charter of Rights
and Freedoms.14 These individuals are vulnerable to arbitrary search and seizure because they
lack a prototypical ‘home’ within which they would be presumed to have an expectation of
privacy. Technological advances in surveillance may further erode the privacy of those living in
poverty.15 GPS tracking technologies, for example, are more easily deployed against the urban
poor, since their vehicles are more likely than those of wealthier citizens to be parked in a public
location and thus be accessible for the placement of the devices.16 Poverty, then, leads to
conditions in which privacy is more difficult to attain, or easier to invade.

Michael Rosenberg, “The Price of Privacy: How Access to Digital Privacy is Slowly Becoming Divided
by Class” (2016) 20:1 UCLA Journal of Law and Technology 1.
12
John Berry, “Nowhere to Hide: How the Judiciary’s Acceptance of Warrantless GPS Tracking
Eliminates the Practical and Legal Privacy Enjoyed by the Poor”, Social Science Research Network (2011),
online: SSRN <https://ssrn.com/abstract=1949387>; Christopher Slobogin, “The Poverty Exception to the
Fourth Amendment” (2003) 55:1 Florida Law Review 391; Kami Chavis Simmons, “Future of the Fourth
Amendment: The Problem with Privacy, Poverty and Policing” (2014) 14:2 University of Maryland Law
Journal of Race, Religion, Gender & Class 240.
13
See Justin Stec, “Why the Homeless are Denied Personhood Under the Law: Toward Contextualizing the
Reasonableness Standard in Search and Seizure Jurisprudence” (2006) 3:2 Rutgers Journal of Law &
Urban Policy 321; Mark A Godsey, “Privacy and the Growing Plight of the Homeless: Reconsidering the
Values Underlying the Fourth Amendment” (1992) 53:3 Ohio State Law Journal 869.
14
Carol Kauppi & Henri Pallard, “Homeless People and the Police: Unreasonable Searches and Seizures,
and Arbitrary Detentions and Arrests” (2009) 1:6 Conference of the International Journal of Arts and
Sciences 344, online: Open Access Library <openaccesslibrary.org/images/MAL231_Henri_Pallard.pdf>.
15
Amelia L Diedrich, “Secure in Their Yards? Curtilage, Technology, and the Aggravation of the Poverty
Exception to the Fourth Amendment” (2011) 39:1 Hastings Constitutional Law Quarterly 297.
16
Berry, supra note 12.
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The privacy of members of vulnerable communities can be, and is, compromised by
surveillance directed toward those communities. Surveillance of welfare recipients has in some
cases been justified on the basis that they are receiving assistance from the state,17 but others have
argued that this surveillance most significantly affects single, racialized mothers.18 In the United
States, many jurisdictions require welfare recipients to undergo government mandated drug
testing.19 Techniques of public health screening and surveillance are also selectively directed
towards vulnerable members of society. One example is a drug-screening program for pregnant
women, enacted by the Medical University of South Carolina in the late 1980’s.20 The program,
designed to reduce the impact of prenatal cocaine use on fetuses, was directed specifically toward
women who had not obtained prenatal care and those with a previous history of drug or alcohol
abuse. If the woman tested positive, the results were turned over to the police, and the woman
was threatened with prosecution in order to force her into treatment. A great deal has been written
about the legality of the program, along with analyses of the US Supreme Court decision that
determined that the testing violated Fourth Amendment rights.21 For our purposes, however, the
fact that this program was ruled unconstitutional is less relevant than the fact that the testing, and
the negative effects emanating from it, were highly discriminatory, affecting primarily lowincome and racialized women. This is just one of many examples where surveillance is directed at
vulnerable populations, with predictable and often negative results.

Mike Dee, “Welfare Surveillance, Income Management and New Paternalism in Australia” (2013) 11:3
Surveillance & Society 272; Krystle Maki “Neoliberal Deviants and Surveillance: Welfare Recipients
Under the Watchful Eye of Ontario Works” (2011) 9:1/2 Surveillance & Society 47; Paul Henman & Greg
Marston, “The Social Division of Welfare Surveillance” (2008) 37:2 Journal of Social Policy 187.
18
John Gilliom, The Overseers of the Poor: Surveillance, Resistance, and the Limits of Privacy (Chicago:
University of Chicago Press, 2001).
19
Celia Goetzl, “Government Mandated Drug Testing for Welfare Recipients: Special Need or
Unconstitutional Condition?” (2013) 15:5 University of Pennsylvania Journal of Constitutional Law 1539.
20
Lawrence O Gostin, “The Rights of Pregnant Women: The Supreme Court and Drug Testing” (2001)
31:5 Hastings Centre Report 8. See also Kristina B Wolff, “Panic in the ER: Maternal Drug Use, the Right
to Bodily Integrity, Privacy, and Informed Consent” (2011) 39:5 Politics & Policy 679.
21
See e.g. Andrew E Taslitz, “A Feminist Fourth Amendment? Consent, Care, Privacy, and Social
Meaning in Ferguson v. City of Charleston” (2002) 9:1 Duke Journal of Gender Law & Policy 1.
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There exist myriad examples of selective use of privacy-compromising technologies by
police against members of marginalized communities. In Canada, DNA technology and
“voluntary” DNA collection programs have been deployed in the context of law enforcement
initiatives relating to violence against Indigenous women and girls. These include an initiative
involving the collection of DNA and other personal information from women (often Indigenous
women) engaged in what have been termed “vulnerable lifestyles”, as well as an initiative
involving the collection of DNA from men living in a remote First Nations community that was
the site of the violent death of a young girl.22 Police stops of racialized youth, particularly young
men, are so common that the phrase “driving while black” has become part of the public
lexicon.23 For example, recent data from Ottawa indicate that police there are disproportionately
likely to target Middle Eastern and black drivers for “random” traffic stops.24
Not only do conditions of marginalization – e.g. poverty – make people more vulnerable
to privacy intrusions; privacy intrusions have the potential to increase the effects of
marginalization. As Kimberly Bailey points out, “because privacy makes an individual less
vulnerable to oppressive state social control, the deprivation of privacy can be an important
aspect of one’s subordination”.25 Michele Estrin Gilman makes a similar point about the impact
of privacy intrusions (in this case, on the poor), suggesting that “the poor as a group suffer

Jane Bailey & Sara Shayan, “Missing and Murdered Indigenous Women Crisis: Technological
Dimensions” (2016) 28:2 Canadian Journal of Women and the Law 321.
23
David A Harris, “The Stories, the Statistics, and the Law: Why “Driving While Black” Matters” (1999)
84:2 Minnesota Law Review 265.
24
Ontario Human Rights Commission, OHRC Response to the Race Data and Traffic Stops in Ottawa
Report, (Ontario: OHRC, 18 November 2016), online: OHRC <www.ohrc.on.ca/en/ohrc-response-racedata-and-traffic-stops-ottawa-report>; Lorne Foster, Les Jacobs & Bobby Siu, “Race Data and Traffic
Stops in Ottawa, 2013-2015: A Report on Ottawa and the Police Districts” (Ottawa Police Services Board
and Ottawa Police Service, October 2016) at 3 online: Ottawa Police
<https://www.ottawapolice.ca/en/about-us/resources/.TSRDCP_York_Research_Report.pdf>.
25
Kimberly D Bailey, “Watching Me: The War on Crime, Privacy, and the State” (2014) 47:5 UC Davis
Law Review 1539 at 1542.
22

extreme privacy violations, which in turn pose a barrier to self-sufficiency and democratic
participation”.26
Privacy violations can increase marginalization by signaling that the victims lack social
standing or somehow deserve the intrusion.27 The widespread practice of “carding”, for example,
signals to others that those stopped by police might be dangerous, thus potentially altering
attitudes and behavior toward them. Increased surveillance – and the lack of privacy that it entails
– increases the risk that some wrongdoing will be identified. Paul Henman and Greg Marston, for
example, discuss the “risk logic” of compliance activities in the Australian social security
system.28 That system uses statistical profiling to identify clients who share characteristics with
those who have in the past “been incorrectly paid” (read: committed welfare fraud). Even though
individuals identified as having these characteristics may never themselves have “been
incorrectly paid,” they are subjected, by virtue of their statistical resemblance to the group who
have, to increased surveillance – which, by its very nature, increases the likelihood that “incorrect
payments” will be identified. The system is a self-reinforcing feedback loop that creates an
underclass within the larger (and vulnerable) group of those receiving social benefits from the
state. Jessica Roberts explicitly ties a lack of privacy to discrimination, noting that “[u]nlawful
discrimination … frequently requires discriminators to have knowledge about protected status”.29
Roberts’ analysis suggests that privacy may be important to prevent discrimination.30 While we
do not believe that privacy protections could or should supplant equality-based antidiscrimination measures and education, in a context in which identifiability as a member of
particular marginalized communities is the basis for discrimination, it seems logical to suggest
Michele Estrin Gilman, “The Class Differential in Privacy Law” (2012) 77:4 Brooklyn Law Review
1389 at 1395.
27
See Craig Konnoth, “An Expressive Theory of Privacy Intrusions” (2017) 102:4 Iowa Law Review 1533
for a discussion of this point. See also Julilly Kohler-Hausmann, “‘The Crime of Survival’: Fraud
Prosecutions, Community Surveillance and the Original ‘Welfare Queen’” (2007) 41:2 Journal of Social
History 329.
28
Henman & Marston, supra note 17 at 200.
29
Jessica L Roberts, “Protecting Privacy to Prevent Discrimination” (2015) 56:6 William and Mary Law
Review 2097 at 2097.
30
Ibid at 2101.
26

that privacy intrusions have the potential to foster discriminatory practices and thus privacy
protection could help to reduce discrimination.

B.

Connecting the Privacy/Vulnerability Cycle to Court Records

Calo identifies the relationship between privacy and vulnerability as a “circle” or “cycle”: “the
more vulnerable a person is, the less privacy they tend to enjoy; meanwhile, a lack of privacy
opens the door to greater vulnerability and exploitation”.31 In the remainder of this paper, we
explore one version of this “vicious cycle”, examining the links between privacy, vulnerability,
and the open (and increasingly online) publication of court records.
We have argued elsewhere that although public access to court records is consistent with
the open court principle, which supports transparency of court proceedings, public access to
unredacted court records, particularly if placed online, presents significant and unwarranted
privacy risks to those involved in court processes.32 These files often contain information that is
deeply personal and potentially very sensitive, including identifying information, financial
information, details about relationships, and details about health status.33 The release of this
information exposes litigants, witnesses and others identified in the court processes to a variety of
risks, including identity theft and extortion.34 Those identified in the records can suffer dignity
harms when highly personal information such as the details of a marital breakdown become
publicly available.35 When the information in the records includes details about protected status,
there is also the risk of discrimination.36

31

Calo, supra note 1 at 591.
Bailey & Burkell, supra note 2.
33
Peter A Winn, “Online Court Records: Balancing Judicial Accountability and Privacy in an Age of
Electronic Information” (2004) 79:1 Washington Law Review 307; Sujoy Chatterjee, “Balancing Privacy
and the Open Court Principle in Family Law: Does De-Identifying Case Law Protect Anonymity?” (2014)
23:1 Dalhousie Journal of Legal Studies 9; Bailey & Burkell, ibid at 148.
34
Bailey & Burkell, ibid at 175.
35
Chatterjee, supra note 33 at 97.
36
Roberts, supra note 29 at 2101.
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Members of marginalized communities stand to suffer the most significant privacy harms
from open court records that include names along with a vast array of other identifying, and often
highly personal, information. In the following section, we identify three bases for this argument:
first, members of marginalized communities are over-represented in many kinds of court
proceedings; second, in order to contest (and potentially redress) the impact of marginalization,
members of these communities are forced to engage with the justice system; third, the potentially
stigmatizing information that is revealed about these individuals in court records leaves them
vulnerable to increased discrimination and other harms.

(1) Vulnerable Populations Over-Represented in Court Proceedings
Members of equality-seeking groups bear a larger privacy burden related to open court records to
the extent that they are over-represented among those identified in those court records. Few
statistics exist to document the demographic characteristics of individuals involved in the court
system as defendants or parties, and even less evidence exists with respect to witnesses and others
(e.g. children in family court cases) who are discussed in court proceedings. Nonetheless, analysis
of involvement with the criminal justice system and examination of factors related to child
protection issues and the incidence of justiciable problems strongly suggests that members of
equality-seeking groups are likely to be over-represented in court records.
Involvement with the criminal justice system is correlated with a range of overlapping
marginalizing conditions. There is widespread recognition of the negative correlation between
socioeconomic status and involvement with the criminal justice system: those lower on the
socioeconomic scale are over-represented in the system.37 The limited body of research on the
relationship between homelessness and the criminal justice system suggests that homeless
individuals, including street-involved youth, are at an increased risk of involvement with the

Ruth R Kipping et al, “Multiple Risk Behaviour in Adolescence and Socio-Economic Status: Findings
from a UK Birth Cohort” (2015) 25:1 European Journal of Public Health 44.
37

criminal justice system.38 A 2002 report on homeless individuals in Calgary, for example,
indicated that over three-quarters had at some point in their lives been incarcerated,39 and
homelessness and incarceration have a reciprocal relationship: homelessness increases the risk of
incarceration, which is in turn associated with higher rates of homelessness.40 Among women
who have been incarcerated, poverty is strongly associated with recidivism, and thus involvement
anew in criminal justice proceedings.41
In the United States, race is strongly associated with arrest history, particularly for males,
with black males having a much higher probability of arrest record than any other group.42
Canadian data show a similar picture, indicating that black inmates are over-represented in the
incarcerated population.43 In Canada, a similar situation exists with respect to the Indigenous
population. Indigenous people make up 4.3% of the general population, but 24.6% of the inmate
population.44 Indigenous women are even more over-represented, comprising 35% of federal
prison inmates, and are Canada’s fastest growing prison population.45 Gender non-conforming

Sylvia Novac et al, “Justice and Injustice: Homelessness, Crime, Victimization, and the Criminal Justice
System” (2006) Centre for Urban and Community Studies, online: University of Toronto
<www.urbancentre.utoronto.ca/pdfs/researchprojects/Novacet-al-207-JusticeHomeless2006.pdf>;
Employment and Social Development Canada, “Mental Health Courts: Processes, Outcomes and Impact on
Homelessness” by Sue-Ann MacDonald et al, (Montreal: Université de Montreal, May 2014), online:
Canadian Observatory on Homelessness <www.homelesshub.ca/sites/default/files/
HKDFinalReport_2014.pdf >.
39
Helen Gardiner & Kathleen Cairns, “2002 Calgary Homelessness Study”, Calgary Homeless Foundation
(October 2002) at 46, online: CHF <http://homelesshub.ca/sites/default/files/Calgary%20
Homelessness%20Study%202002.pdf>.
40
“Criminal Justice, Homelessness & Health”, National Healthcare for the Homeless Council (2011)
online: NHCHC <www.nhchc.org/wp-content/uploads/2011/09/CriminalJustice2011_final.pdf>.
41
Kristy Holtfreter, Michael D Reisig & Merry Morash, “Poverty, State Capital, and Recidivism Among
Women Offenders” (2004) 3:2 Criminology & Public Policy 185.
42
Robert Brame et al, “Demographic Patterns of Cumulative Arrest Prevalence by Ages 18 and 23” (2014)
60:3 Crime & Delinquency 471.
43
As of 2015, the “federal incarceration rate for Blacks [was] three times their representation in Canadian
society”. See Canada, Office of the Correctional Investigator, Annual Report of the Office of the
Correctional Investigator 2014-2015, by Howard Sapers (Ottawa: OCI, 26 June, 2015), online: OCI
<www.oci-bec.gc.ca/cnt/rpt/annrpt/annrpt20142015-eng.aspx>.
44
Ibid.
45
Ibid.
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youth, and particularly youth identifying as transgender, are more likely to be involved with the
youth criminal justice system.46

In a 2012 report, the Mental Health Commission of Canada47 noted the over-representation in the
criminal justice system of those living with mental health issues; this issue may be particularly
acute among youth.48 This over-representation, also observed in the United States, has been
attributed in large part to deinstitutionalization.49 Although there is growing recognition that
mental illness is unfairly criminalized in Canada,50 programs designed to divert those with mental
illness before they are charged (police-based diversion programs) are of limited effectiveness
given the lack of treatment options for those living with mental illness.51 Persons with intellectual
disabilities are also over-represented in the criminal justice system,52 in part as a result of their
lack of understanding of court processes and their rights within those processes.53 Within the
criminal justice system, defendants with mental health issues can in some circumstances be
diverted to special mental health courts,54 “designed to deal with accused persons who are

Angela Irvine, “We’ve Had Three of Them: Addressing the Invisibility of Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual, and
Gender Nonconforming Youths in the Juvenile Justice System” (2010) 19:3 Columbia Journal of Gender
and Law 675; Jerome Hunt & Aisha C Moodie-Mills, “The Unfair Criminalization of Gay and Transgender
Youth: An Overview of the Experiences of LGBT Youth in the Juvenile Justice System”, Center for
American Progress (29 June 2012), online: Center for American Progress
<https://www.americanprogress.org/issues/lgbt/reports/2012/06/29/11730/the-unfair-criminalization-ofgay-and-transgender-youth/>.
47
Mental Health Commission of Canada, Changing Directions, Changing Lives: The Mental Health
Strategy for Canada (Calgary: MHCC, 2012), online: MHCC
<strategy.mentalhealthcommission.ca/pdf/strategy-images-en.pdf>.
48
Michele Peterson-Badali et al, “Mental Health in the Context of Canada’s Youth Justice System” (2015)
19:1 Canadian Criminal Law Review 5.
49
Gary Chaimowitz, “The Criminalization of People with Mental Illness” (2012) 57:2 Canadian Journal of
Psychiatry 1.
50
Ibid at 5.
51
Ibid.
52
Jessica Jones, “Persons with Intellectual Disabilities in the Criminal Justice System” (2007) 51:6
International Journal of Offender Therapy and Comparative Criminology 723.
53
Susan C Hayes, “Prevalence of Intellectual Disability in Local Courts” (1997) 22:2 Journal of Intellectual
& Developmental Disability 71. See also Voula Marions et al, “Persons with Intellectual Disabilities and
the Criminal Justice System: A View from Criminal Justice Professionals in Ontario” (2017) 64:1 Criminal
Law Quarterly 83.
54
Steven K Erickson, Amy Campbell & Steven J Lamberti, “Variations in Mental Health Courts:
Challenges, Opportunities, and a Call for Action” (2006) 42:4 Community Mental Health Journal 335.
46

experiencing mental health difficulties with understanding and sensitivity”.55 Defendants must
meet strict criteria before diversion to these special courts: primary among these is the condition
that the individual must be diagnosed with a mental disorder.56 The mere fact of diversion to these
courts, therefore, reveals meaningful and likely stigmatizing information about the individual
whose case is diverted. Despite this, mental health court records57 and the results of appeals from
those courts are not routinely anonymized across Canada.58
Over-representation of marginalized populations is not limited to the criminal justice
system. In Canada59 and elsewhere,60 Indigenous children, and thus their parents, are at increased
risk for involvement in the child welfare system. Similarly, parents with intellectual disabilities
constitute a higher proportion of child protection cases than would be expected given the
prevalence of intellectual disabilities in the general population.61 One study of the BC child
protection system documented a litany of intersecting challenges facing those (mostly women)
involved in that system, including domestic violence, mental health issues, poverty, and addiction
issues; that study also noted the over-representation of Indigenous mothers in the child protection
cases they reviewed.62 Although child welfare system proceedings are protected from public
access, in many of these cases there are concurrent criminal and/or family proceedings that do not

“Mental Health Court”, Legal Aid Ontario, online: Legal Aid Ontario <lawfacts.ca/mental-health/court>.
See for example the eligibility for Mental Health Court in Nova Scotia: See, “Nova Scotia Mental Health
Court Program”, Courts of Nova Scotia, online: Courts of Nova Scotia
<www.courts.ns.ca/Provincial_Court/NSPC_mental_health_program.htm>.
57
For example, hearings in and records relating to Vancouver’s Downtown Community Court are public.
58
See, for example: R v E, 2012 NLCA 26. We have chosen to anonymize citations that raise the very
privacy and equality concerns discussed in this article.
59
Nico Trocmé, Della Knoke & Cindy Blackstock, “Pathways to the Overrepresentation of Aboriginal
Children in Canada’s Child Welfare System” (2004) 78:4 Social Service Review 577.
60
Clare Tilbury, “The Over-Representation of Indigenous Children in the Australian Child Welfare
System” (2009) 18:1 International Journal of Social Welfare 57.
61
Stephon Proctor & Sandra Azar, “The Effect of Parental Intellectual Disability Status on Child Protection
Service Worker Decision Making” (2013) 57:12 Journal of Intellectual Disability Research 1104.
62
Judith Mosoff et al, “Intersecting Challenges: Mothers and Child Protection Law in BC” (2017) 50:2
UBC Law Review 435.
55
56

automatically receive such protection;63 thus, the greater involvement of individuals from
equality-seeking groups in these matters is likely to be associated with involvement in other
justice system proceedings that do present privacy risks.

Members of vulnerable groups including Indigenous peoples, immigrants, those receiving
social assistance, members of ethnic minorities, and those living with disabilities are more likely
to experience justiciable problems such as personal injury, family breakdown, or issues with
assistance programs.64 These problems, moreover, tend to occur in clusters: for example, legal
problems related to separation are often accompanied by problems with domestic violence, and
other issues related to family breakdown such as custody and access.65 Similarly, individuals
living with disabilities are not only more likely to experience these types of problems; they also
experience more such problems.66 To the extent that members of marginalized groups recognize
their problems as legal problems or are involved with others who do, they may be more likely to
be involved, and involved more intensely, with the civil justice system.

Many of these risk factors intersect in the lives of affected individuals, with a
compounding impact on the likelihood that the individual will be involved with the court system.
Mental health issues and drug use are elevated among the homeless population.67 People with
mental health challenges often live in poverty, while mentally ill and homeless adults are more
likely to be involved in the criminal justice system if they also experience substance misuse and
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previous victimization.68 Indigenous peoples are more likely than the general population to live in
conditions of homelessness.69
An exhaustive review of the relationship between vulnerability and justice system
involvement is beyond the scope of this paper, but the pattern is clear: people who are socially
marginalized are more likely to be involved with the justice system (or at least with certain
aspects of it). Those individuals involved in the system are also vulnerable to the privacy harms
that result from being identified in court records. Those harms, therefore, are differentially
affecting specific groups – the socially marginalized who are, by virtue of a wide range of factors,
more likely to be in the courts.

(2) Addressing Marginalization in the Courts
Marginalized individuals suffer harms related to their marginalized status – and one way to
address these harms is to seek relief in the courts or through administrative tribunals. These
situations constitute a kind of double jeopardy or recursive effect: vulnerability leads to
involvement with the justice system, which leads to loss of privacy, including privacy with
respect to vulnerable status, which in turn can lead to increased discrimination.
Homeless individuals, for example, have been involved in court proceedings that test
their right to erect shelters in public parks70 or on city property,71 with the result that their names
are made public along with details of their homeless status. ‘Safe Streets’ legislation, passed in
Ontario72 and in British Columbia,73 prohibits “aggressive solicitation of persons in public
places”, allowing police to issue tickets for panhandling. Given that the individuals so charged are
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typically living in conditions of poverty, it is not surprising that the tickets often go unpaid. At
least one individual has been taken to court over unpaid fines.74 This individual opted to
participate in press interviews about the case, and thus forewent his privacy with respect to the
court proceeding and personal information about himself and his situation.75 Nonetheless, his
option to maintain privacy with respect to private matters including his homeless status would
have been wiped out by the public nature of the court proceeding. In other cases, individuals have
been charged under Ontario’s Safe Streets Act for soliciting an individual waiting at a bus stop76
or offering to clean car windows for passing motorists.77 Although the disclosures in most of
these records are limited to the names of the individuals involved and the activities they are
charged with undertaking (which by extension label the individuals as street-involved), one of the
records goes into much greater detail, revealing highly personal information about the social
history and mental health of the individual charged with the offence. In these cases, there is a
direct link between marginalized status (homelessness, for example) and the appearance before
the courts.
The relationship between vulnerability and involvement is even more direct in the case of
human rights tribunals, where it is precisely an experience of alleged discrimination on the basis
of protected grounds that brings the individual to the tribunal. Some other tribunals and boards,
including the Veterans Appeal Review Board, routinely remove identifying information on the
grounds that it is “personal information not relevant to the decision”.78 Likewise, the Social
Benefits Tribunal of Ontario holds hearings in private because of the sensitive personal
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information involved in the cases.79 Many individuals involved in immigration and refugee
proceedings are there precisely because they are members of equality-seeking groups. The status
of sensitive information revealed in these hearings is complex: proceedings before the Refugee
Protection Division and the Refugee Appeal Division are private unless decisions are before the
Federal Court for judicial review, and proceedings before the Immigration Appeal Division and
the Immigration Division are public. Human rights tribunals in Canada, however, default to the
identification of parties involved in human rights cases. The Human Rights Tribunal of Ontario
(“HRTO”), for example, tells potential applicants that “the hearings and decisions of the HRTO
are public except in very special circumstances … and the tribunal’s decisions, which include the
applicants’ names and relevant evidence, are made publicly available through legal reporting
services”.80 We will return to the HRTO’s practices with respect to anonymization in Part III
below.

(3) Records Reveal Stigmatizing Information
Open records of human rights tribunal proceedings reveal not only the name of the applicant, but
also details of the alleged discrimination including the basis for that alleged discrimination
(unless the applicant is successful in taking the often-costly step of seeking a publication ban or
some other form of confidentiality order). Thus, for example, in the records of these cases we can
come to learn that an applicant suffers from depression, is pregnant, lives with a learning
disability, identifies as transgender, or is homeless. These details are not incidentally revealed as
part of the tribunal proceeding – they are necessarily revealed since they often constitute the basis
of the claim that is substance of the proceeding. Moreover, the personal information that is
Social Justice Tribunals Ontario, “Social Benefits Tribunal: Legislation and Regulation”, (Ontario:
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exposed in these records leaves the individual vulnerable to further discrimination. Thus, public
access to these records can contribute to a “vicious cycle” of vulnerability.
The concern is not unfounded. One complainant who was found by the BC Human
Rights Tribunal (BCHRT) to have experienced discrimination based on a mental health issue81
was in front of that same tribunal seven years later, again alleging discrimination based on mental
illness.82 In that second complaint, which the Tribunal determined was justified, it was alleged
that the respondents enacted their discrimination on the basis of information gleaned from the
earlier human rights case – in other words, their knowledge of the mental illness could at least in
part be attributed to an earlier, and public, human rights complaint.83
Presumptive openness of court and tribunal records constitutes, for litigants, witnesses,
and others named in the court process, forced disclosure of personal information. Given the
option, people make careful and thoughtful decisions about to whom, when, and where to
disclose personal information.84 This may be particularly true for stigmatizing conditions, where
the potential consequences of disclosure include discrimination, social isolation, and even
physical danger. Many individuals living with a disability, for example, choose not to disclose, in
large part for fear of discrimination, especially with respect to employment.85 Individuals in the
work force dealing with mental health issues who choose not to disclose cite fear of
discrimination as the primary reason.86 Many living with positive HIV status carefully balance the
psychological advantages of disclosure against the costs in terms of stigma and social inclusion.87
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While disclosure of transgender identity can have positive impacts on psychological well-being
and personal relationships, it also raises the risk of loss of relationships and even physical
violence.88 Notwithstanding the potential destigmatizing effects,89 disclosure of a marginalized
status can harm the individual involved.90 It has been compellingly argued that we should not
force such disclosures,91 since the practice could contravene constitutional protections,92 and
might even be considered immoral.93
Over-representation of marginalized communities in court and tribunal proceedings, often
because of the impact of marginalization, combined with the potentially stigmatizing information
that is revealed about individuals in court records leaves members of these communities
disproportionately vulnerable to further discrimination and other harms. The potential for these
harms stand to be exacerbated by widespread publicly-accessible online access to court records.
We turn now to examine some of the limited instances in which Canadian law has recognized and
responded to this “vicious cycle”.

III.

Recognition of the Privacy/Vulnerability Cycle in Canadian Law

Notwithstanding that in most cases the privacy of those involved with court proceedings is not
protected, our purpose in this section is to identify situations where Canadian law has explicitly or
implicitly recognized the privacy/vulnerability cycle as a justification for limiting publication
related to, or disclosure within court proceedings involving members of marginalized
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communities. In tandem with situations in which Canadian courts and legislatures have
recognized the privacy/vulnerability cycle in the context of disclosure of information to the public
about court proceedings, are privacy-justified rules that limit both what must be produced in
litigation and what can be done with it afterward. We begin by briefly discussing publication
bans, which limit public access to information about court proceedings, and then turn to case-bycase privilege and deemed/implied undertakings, which impose terms relating to disclosure within
litigation. In both cases, the law recognizes the privacy/vulnerability cycle and expresses concern
about the impact of process-imposed vulnerability on the administration of justice. We note the
transition in this law from recognition of a general privacy/vulnerability cycle to limited
recognition of special risks to specific equality-seeking communities: children and sexual assault
survivors in particular. After discussing publication bans, case-by-case privilege and deemed
undertakings, we explore other legal manifestations of concern for children and sexual assault
survivors before turning to consider more sporadic legal acknowledgments of the
privacy/vulnerability cycle relating to other equality-seeking groups. Finally, we consider policy
development and commentary focused on the privacy/vulnerability cycle in the context of online
court records, which supports our concern about the potential for online records to exacerbate the
cycle for equality-seeking communities.

A.

Publication Bans and the Privacy/Vulnerability Cycle

The open court principle is highly venerated in Canadian law. It provides that, as a general rule,
court processes and court records should be publicly accessible. Openness is said to build “public
confidence in the integrity of the judicial system by allowing members of the public to hold
judges to account”.94 The common law principle in favour of openness is also mirrored in
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provincial, federal and territorial statutes and policies governing court proceedings.95
Nevertheless, Canadian courts and legislators have recognized that, in certain circumstances,
open access can undermine justice or come at too great a cost to other democratic values in a
variety of ways. As a result, certain statutes and common law principles provide for courts and
certain other decision-making bodies to determine on a case-by-case basis whether there should
be an exception to that rule. These case-by-case decisions are to be made with reference to the
Supreme Court of Canada’s decisions in two seminal cases relating to publication bans, R v
Mentuck96 and Dagenais v Canadian Broadcasting Corp.97
In Mentuck, the Supreme Court of Canada held that a publication ban should only be
issued where:
(a) such an order is necessary in order to prevent a serious risk to the proper
administration of justice because reasonably alternative measures will not prevent the
risk; and
(b) the salutary effects of the publication ban outweigh the deleterious effects on the
rights and interests of the parties and the public, including the effects on the right to free
expression, the right of the accused to a fair and public trial, and the efficacy of the
administration of justice.98
In Dagenais, the Supreme Court of Canada pointed to a long list of competing considerations of
sufficient weight to warrant a publication ban. At least three of these implicitly recognize the way
in which a lack of privacy can exacerbate inequality and vulnerability, namely: protecting
vulnerable witnesses (e.g. children, sexual assault complainants); reducing the stigma of
conviction for young offenders, thereby increasing the possibility of rehabilitation; and
95

See e.g. Courts of Justice Act, RSO 1990, c C43, ss 135, 137; Provincial Court of British Columbia,
“Access to Court Records”, Policy Code ACC-2, (British Columbia: 28 February 2011) online: Provincial
Court BC <www.provincialcourt.bc.ca/downloads/public%20and%20media%20access%20policies/ACC2%20-%20Access%20to%20Court%20Records.pdf>
96
2001 SCC 76 [Mentuck].
97
[1994] 3 SCR 835 [Dagenais].
98
Mentuck, supra note 97 at para 32.

encouraging reporting of sexual offences by reducing the fear of notoriety of becoming a
complainant.99
The issues of protecting children and targets of sexual violence came together in AB v
Bragg.100 The Supreme Court of Canada held that a teen girl who sought a publication ban on the
content of a Facebook page in which she was subjected to “sexualized cyberbullying”, should be
allowed to proceed using a pseudonym on a preliminary application for disclosure.101 Relying on
the decisions in Dagenais and Mentuck, and noting research showing that “allowing the names of
child victims and other identifying information to appear in the media can exacerbate trauma,
complicate recovery, discourage future disclosures, and inhibit cooperation with authorities”,102
as well as the lasting harms of the publicity of sexualized online attacks, Abella J, writing for the
Court, concluded:

If we value the right of children to protect themselves from bullying, cyber or otherwise,
if common sense and the evidence persuade us that young victims of sexualized bullying
are particularly vulnerable to the harms of revictimization upon publication, and if we
accept that the right to protection will disappear for most children without the further
protection of anonymity, we are compellingly drawn in this case to allowing A.B.’s
anonymous legal pursuit of the identity of her cyberbully.103

Here the Court explicitly recognized the “vicious cycle” of a lack of privacy and the “inherent
vulnerability of children”.104 In addition, Abella J noted that “[i]n the context of sexual assault,
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this Court has already recognized that protecting a victim’s privacy encourages reporting”.105 In
this way, the cycle of gender inequality and lack of privacy in court proceedings is evident,
although the Court did not explicitly discuss the plaintiff’s situation in these terms. The plaintiff
had already suffered a sexualized online attack (which included someone impersonating her and
posting a photo of her), a kind of attack disproportionately suffered by women and girls, who are
also more likely to be shamed in relation to exhibitions of their sexuality.106 A refusal to grant AB
a degree of privacy in relation to her legal proceeding would have re-subjected her to further
gendered scrutiny and attack – a classic illustration of the “vicious cycle” between the
vulnerability of marginalized populations and a lack of privacy in court proceedings. Although
AB was ultimately able to proceed under a pseudonym, her right to do so came at the cost of
appeals all the way to the Supreme Court of Canada – a price most people, particularly those from
many marginalized communities, are unlikely to be able to pay.

B.

Case-by-case Privilege and Deemed/Implied Undertakings

In contrast with publication bans, which focus solely on public access to information about court
proceedings, case-by-case privilege and deemed/implied undertakings impose limits relating to
procedures internal to litigation. In both cases the focus is on balancing privacy with other kinds
of public interests. In some cases, Canadian courts explicitly or implicitly connect privacy with
vulnerability, and the risk that exposing litigants to too much vulnerability will jeopardize their
right and ability to seek legal remedies. Thus, despite the truth-finding goal of litigation and the
idea that disclosure of all relevant information best serves that goal, parties need not produce all
relevant documents within litigation. As the British Columbia Court of Appeal, per Southin JA,
noted in Interclaim Holdings Limited v Down:
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Suffice it to say that, in my opinion, … the notion that everybody is entitled to have
access to everything filed in civil proceedings … in contradistinction to having the right
to be present at every proceeding in which a final judgment is sought should be
canvassed again. A legal system which has no decent respect for the privacy of litigants
is as tyrannical as a legal system in which rights are determined behind closed doors.107

Documents subject to privilege represent an important exception to the general disclosure rule.108
While the traditional categories of privilege protect the solicitor-client relationship (solicitorclient privilege) and the process of litigation (litigation privilege), in Slavutych v Baker et al, the
Supreme Court of Canada confirmed that those categories are not closed109 and adopted a fourpart test for determining on a case-by-case basis whether materials claimed to be confidential
should be exempt from disclosure. This privilege applies to communications that: (i) originate in
confidence; (ii) where confidence is essential to the relationship in which the communication
arose; (iii) that relationship is one that should be “sedulously fostered; and (iv) the interests
served by protecting against disclosure outweigh the interest in getting at the truth to correctly
resolve the litigation.110
In applying this four-part test in the context of a civil sexual assault case in M(A) v Ryan,
where the defendant sought production of records from the plaintiff’s psychiatrist, the Supreme
Court of Canada found that if psychiatrist-patient confidence was broken, it could jeopardize a
patient’s willingness to seek treatment.111 Justice McLachlin (as she was then) writing for the
majority, noted that such an outcome was to be avoided, especially in the context of survivors of
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“sexual abuse [who] often suffer trauma, which, left untreated, may mar their entire lives”.112 In
reaching this conclusion, the Court relied on constitutional protections for privacy and equality,
noting:

A rule of privilege which fails to protect confidential doctor/patient communications in
the context of an action arising out of sexual assault perpetuates the disadvantage felt by
victims of sexual assault, often women. The intimate nature of sexual assault heightens
the privacy concerns of the victim and may increase, if automatic disclosure is the rule,
the difficulty of obtaining redress for the wrong. The victim of a sexual assault is thus
placed in a disadvantaged position as compared with the victim of a different wrong. The
result may be that the victim of sexual assault does not obtain the equal benefit of the law
to which s. 15 of the Charter entitles her. She is doubly victimized, initially by the sexual
assault and later by the price she must pay to claim redress.113

McLachlin J also rejected the argument that a plaintiff forfeits the right to privacy by
commencing litigation, finding:

I accept that a litigant must accept such intrusions upon her privacy as are necessary to
enable the judge or jury to get to the truth and render a just verdict. But I do not accept
that by claiming such damages as the law allows, a litigant grants her opponent a licence
to delve into private aspects of her life which need not be probed for the proper
disposition of the litigation.114
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This reasoning subsequently carried over into analysis of the privacy rights of sexual assault
complainants in the context of the deemed undertaking.

The deemed and implied undertaking rules115 generally prohibit disclosure of “pre-trial
documentary and oral discovery for purposes other than the litigation in which it was
obtained”.116 Although these rules do not place similar restrictions on documentary and oral
discovery that make their way into the public record during trials or motions, they nevertheless
reflect recognition of the privacy/vulnerability cycle and its potential impact on the administration
of justice. In Juman v Doucette, the Supreme Court of Canada, per Binnie J, pointed to privacy
protection as one of two related rationales for these undertakings:

The public interest in getting at the truth in a civil action outweighs the examinee’s
privacy interest, but the latter is nevertheless entitled to a measure of protection. The
answers and documents are compelled by statute solely for the purpose of the civil action
and the law thus requires that the invasion of privacy should generally be limited to the
level of disclosure necessary to satisfy that purpose and that purpose alone. ...

There is a second rationale supporting the existence of an implied undertaking. A litigant
who has some assurance that the documents and answers will not be used for a purpose
collateral or ulterior to the proceedings in which they are demanded will be encouraged to
provide a more complete and candid discovery.117
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That the imposition of such limits can be of particular importance in the context of civil and
criminal proceedings relating to sexual assault was recognized at first instance in SC v NS where
the defendant in a criminal sexual assault trial used documents produced by the complainant in a
civil sexual assault proceeding in order to impeach her during her testimony at the criminal
trial.118 The Court’s finding that the deemed undertaking prevented the defendant from using the
documents in another proceeding without first seeking leave of the court was overturned on
appeal. However, the observations of Matheson J with respect to privacy remain apt. Justice
Matheson rejected the defendant’s argument that the plaintiff had given up her right to privacy by
initiating the civil action, reasoning:

If that choice defeated all privacy interests, the deemed undertaking would not exist.
Instead, the court and the Rules of Civil Procedure have acknowledged that plaintiffs
remain entitled to some measure of protection of their privacy and are entitled to
limitations on the use of their discovery evidence outside the proceedings for which the
discovery was compelled.119

Finding that “[t]he primary concern underlying the undertaking is the protection of privacy –
discovery is an invasion of the right of an individual to keep one’s evidence and documents to
oneself”,120 Matheson J went on to note the privacy/vulnerability cycle recognized in Criminal
Code121 restrictions on use of complainant’s medical or counselling records in a sexual assault
trial. In particular, she noted that parliamentary adoption of those restrictions and a detailed
process for determining whether such records could be used:
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Parliament has recognized that the compelled production of personal information may
deter complainants of sexual offences from reporting the events to police and from
seeking the necessary treatment, counselling or advice; that production may breach a
person’s right to privacy and equality; and that the production to the accused of such
information may be necessary in order for an accused to make full answer and defence.122

We turn now to discuss specific exceptions to openness in relation to children and sexual assault
complainants found elsewhere in Canadian law in order to highlight the role that recognition of
the privacy/vulnerability cycle plays in relation to each, paying particular attention to
explanations for exceptions that connect privacy, vulnerability and membership in equalityseeking communities.

C.

Children and the Privacy/Vulnerability Cycle

The connection between the privacy/vulnerability cycle and marginalization is most consistently
demonstrated in Canadian law with respect to the protection of children in court proceedings.
Here we provide examples from two areas: child welfare and family law proceedings, and the
Youth Criminal Justice Act (“YCJA”).123

(1) Child Welfare and Family Law Proceedings
In addition to the examples discussed in part A above, Canadian courts also connect privacy with
the vulnerability of children in the context of provincial child welfare legislation124 and in family
law proceedings.125 Although child welfare legislation can incorporate both provisions that
initially presume in favour of openness and those that initially presume against openness, here we
122

SC, supra note 119 at para 95.
SC 2002, c 1 [YCJA].
124
See e.g. Child and Family Services Act, RSO 1990, c C11, s 45(8); Child and Family Services Act, SS
1989-90, c C-7.2, s 26 [CFSA].
125
See e.g. Provincial Court Act, RSBC 1996, c 379, s 3(6) [Provincial Court Act].
123

focus on the former. In Chatham-Kent Children’s Services v AH, the Ontario Superior Court of
Justice allowed a media request to vary an order excluding the public from a hearing by allowing
access to a redacted copy of the transcript of an in camera hearing in a child protection
proceeding involving the disappearance of several children who had been apprehended from the
jurisdiction.126 Although citing Bragg, and other criminal and family law cases, Templeton J
noted that the case before him was not a criminal, civil matter or family law matter, but a child
protection proceeding. He concluded that restrictions on public access to the transcript were
necessary because:
in certain circumstances, the protection of a vulnerable child and that child’s privacy may
well go beyond merely the name of the child in protection proceedings. Children who are
the subject of an application by the state for intervention are also allegedly vulnerable in
their environment at home, at school and/or in their neighbourhood. They are subject to
the conduct and attitudes of the adults who interact with them. Disclosure to others of the
intimacy of their lives is beyond their control. Without the ability or opportunity for
critical thought, they are swept into a process of the balancing of rights of others and in
that process, it can be difficult to hear their voice.

... In other words, the child’s world and privacy are inextricably linked to an investigation
of the parent’s.127

As a result, Templeton J concluded that in child protection matters, “the need to shield a
vulnerable child rests not only on the child’s chronological age but also and perhaps more
significantly, the factual circumstances in which the child lives or has been placed”.128
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In contrast, while citing similar authorities to those relied upon in AH, the Saskatchewan
Court of Queen’s Bench, per Rothery J, concluded in the context of child protection proceedings
in R(MN) v Saskatchewan (Minister of Social Services) that the CBC could publish the name of a
parent accused of harming her children, provided that they gave advanced notice of the broadcast
to the Department of Social Services in the area where her children resided.129 Rothery J found
that although section 26(2) of the Child and Family Services Act130 permitted publication bans
where publication would not be in the best interests of a child involved in the hearing or would
likely identify a child, “[t]he court is not permitted to weigh the effect of the publication on the
parents of the child. Thus, unless the publication of the parent’s name affects the child, there is no
justification for the limitation of the freedom of expression”.131
Meanwhile, in British Columbia, rules of court impose stringent restrictions on public
access to court records relating to child welfare proceedings, family law cases and separation
agreements,132 and various statutes restrict publication of information in family and children’s
matters that would likely disclose the identity of a child or party.133 As a result, although BC
offers the most extensive online access to court records in Canada through Court Services Online
(“CSO”),134 public access is available only in relation to civil and criminal cases (with certain
exceptions discussed further below), and not in relation to family law cases.

(2) Youth Criminal Justice Act

129

(1999), 179 Sask R 238, (QB) at para 28 [R(MN)].
CFSA, supra note 125.
131
R(MN), supra note 130 at para 26.
132
British Columbia, “Court Record Access Policy”, (Vancouver: Supreme Court of British Columbia,
2011) at 21, online:
<www.courts.gov.bc.ca/supreme_court/announcements/BCSC%20Court%20Record%20Access%20Policy
%20-%20February%2014%202011.pdf>.
133
See e.g. Provincial Court Act, supra note 126.
134
British Columbia, “Welcome to Court Services Online”, Court Services Online, Version 3.0.0.04,
online: Courts of British Columbia <https://justice.gov.bc.ca/cso/index.do>.
130

The YCJA came into effect in 2003, replacing the Young Offenders Act, which had been in place
since 1984.135 The YCJA creates a specialized framework for dealing with children under the age
of 12 and young people between the ages of 12 and 18 who are involved in criminal offences.136
It recognizes society’s responsibility to “address the developmental challenges and the needs of
young persons and to guide them into adulthood”, as well as the “special guarantees” of
children’s and young people’s rights and freedoms, and the goal of “effective rehabilitation and
reintegration” of young people into society after involvement in criminal proceedings.137
Restrictions relating to publication, records and information about young people are
imposed in Part 6 of the YCJA as one means of addressing these objectives. For example, section
110(1) prohibits (subject to specific exceptions) publication of the name of any young person
dealt with under the YCJA, or any other information about them that would identify them, while
later sections in Part 6 impose limitations on creation, access to, and destruction of records related
to YCJA investigations and proceedings involving young people.138 Generally, breach of the
publication ban is a criminal offence.139 According to the Department of Justice:

The rationale for protecting the privacy of young persons through publication bans is in
recognition of their immaturity and the need to protect them from the harmful effects of
publication so that their chances of rehabilitation are maximized.140

The cycle connecting privacy, vulnerability and youth is explored in some detail in a number of
Canadian cases and has been reiterated frequently in parliamentary debate.141
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In FN (Re) the Supreme Court of Canada found that section 110(1) protected already
vulnerable youth made more vulnerable by publication, while at the same time achieving broader
societal goals. Writing for the Court, Binnie J, noted:

Stigmatization or premature “labeling” of a young offender still in his or her formative
years is well understood as a problem in the juvenile justice system. A young person once
stigmatized as a lawbreaker may, unless given help and redirection, render the stigma a
self-fulfilling prophecy. In the long run, society is best protected by preventing
recurrence. Lamer CJ, in Dagenais … pointed out in another context that non-publication
is designed to “maximize the chances of rehabilitation for “young offenders””.142

Abella J, writing for the majority in R v DB the Supreme Court of Canada, cited social science
research and international instruments recognizing the negative impact of media on young people,
in support of the conclusion that the YCJA restrictions on publication afforded necessary
protection to youth because of the “greater psychological and social stress” they would be
vulnerable to upon publication.143 The majority cited expert testimony before the Standing
Committee on Justice that indicated that “you’d be hard-pressed to find a single professional who
has worked in this area who would be in favour of the publication of names”, and appellate
authority from Quebec and Ontario emphasizing the “damage” that “stigmatizing and labelling” a
young person could do to their self-image and self-worth.144 In light of this, the majority, per
Abella J, found that lifting a ban on publication should be seen as an element of sentencing that
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“renders the sentence more severe”.145 However, the majority also tied the right to privacy
protection to a presumed “diminished moral culpability” of young persons, noting that children’s
“lack of experience with the world warrants leniency and optimism for the future”, and
concluding that “offenders who act out of immaturity, impulsiveness, or other
ill-considered motivation are not to be dealt with as if they were proceeding with the same degree
of insight into their wrongdoing as more mature, reflective, or considered individuals”.146
Obviously, this particular aspect of the explanation of the privacy/vulnerability cycle cannot and
should not be extended to adults from other equality-seeking groups.
Relying in part on DB, the Ontario Court of Justice, per Cohen J, in Toronto Star
Newspaper Ltd. v Ontario pointed to the YCJA restrictions on publication as one indication that
the proper administration of justice requires consideration of young people’s privacy rights.147
Cohen J denied a media request for access to victim impact statements and pre-sentence reports in
three cases involving young offenders convicted of serious crimes. She found that the YCJA
publication restrictions were connected to the presumed diminished moral culpability of young
people, but were also rooted in protecting their “dignity, personal integrity and autonomy” as
required by the Convention on the Rights of the Child and the Canadian Charter of Rights and
Freedoms.148 The reasoning in Toronto Star, which the Supreme Court of Canada cited with
approval in Bragg,149 has also been relied upon by other Ontario courts as a touchstone for
protecting young people when determining whether court-connected materials relating to them
ought to be disclosed.150
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D.

Sexual Assault Complainants and the Privacy/Vulnerability Cycle

A number of Criminal Code provisions that connect the privacy/vulnerability cycle with
inequality relate to sexual assault complainants. Here we focus on two such provisions:
prohibition of the publication of identifying information about sexual assault complainants and
restrictions on the use of complainants’ past sexual history at trial.

(1) Prohibitions on Publication of Identifying Information
The Criminal Code includes numerous provisions that initially presume in favour of openness,
but grant judges discretion to impose restrictions relating to hearings and publication of
identifying information. For example, under section 486.31 a judge may, on application by the
prosecutor or a witness, order non-disclosure of a witness’ identity.151 Under section 486.4 a
judge may order non-disclosure of information that could identify a witness or victim in the
context of proceedings involving sexual offences.152 However, under section 486.4(2), a judge
must order non-disclosure of identifying information relating to a witness under 18 or a victim in
proceedings involving sexual offences if the witness, victim or prosecutor applies for such an
order.153 In considering the constitutionality of this provision in Canadian Newspapers Co v
Canada (Attorney General),154 the Supreme Court of Canada connected the cycle of privacy and
vulnerability to the broader societal objective of encouraging reporting of widely under-reported
sexual offences. Lamer J (as he then was), writing for the Court, noted:

In the present case, the impugned provision purports to foster complaints by victims of
sexual assault by protecting them from the trauma of wide-spread publication resulting in
embarrassment and humiliation. Encouraging victims to come forward and complain
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facilitates the prosecution and conviction of those guilty of sexual offences. Ultimately,
the overall objective of the publication ban ... is to favour the suppression of crime and to
improve the administration of justice.155

In this way, the Court recognized the connection between privacy and vulnerability, finding that it
weighed in favour of imposing limitations on publication. However, it tied the concern about
protecting against vulnerability to goals relating to the administration of justice, rather than to
protecting the privacy rights of an equality-seeking group per se. This, combined with the fact
that the Criminal Code provision permits the decision about publication to be taken out of a
sexually assaulted woman’s hands by allowing the prosecutor to make the application, raises
questions about how effectively it addresses the privacy/vulnerability cycle for women, who are
disproportionately likely to be victims of sexual violence.156

(2) Restrictions on the Use of Complainants’ Past Sexual History
The Criminal Code also addresses the privacy rights of sexual assault complainants by imposing
limits on use of the complainant’s past sexual history. Section 276 of the Criminal Code, requires
an accused who seeks to bring forward the past sexual history of a complainant in a sexual assault
case to first bring a motion for leave to do so.157 In deciding whether to allow such evidence, the
court must consider, among other things, “the need to remove from the fact-finding process any
discriminatory belief or bias” and “the potential prejudice to the complainant’s personal dignity
and right of privacy”.158 Publication, broadcast or transmission of information relating to the
application is prohibited unless the evidence is determined admissible or the judge orders the
155
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determination and reasons to be published.159 While it is at best unclear whether this provision is
actually applied in a way that positively affects equality,160 the reasoning underlying the provision
does connect privacy, vulnerability and equality.

In R v Mills161 the Court, referring to its reasons in M(A) (discussed above in Part III.B).,
upheld the constitutionality of Criminal Code amendments that protected against what Justice
L’Heureux-Dubé had previously referred to as “extensive and unwarranted inquiries into the past
histories and private lives of complainants of sexual assault”, a practice she said “indulges the
discriminatory suspicion that women and children’s reports of sexual victimization are uniquely
likely to be fabricated”.162 Noting privacy’s “underlying values of dignity, integrity and
autonomy”,163 McLachlin and Iacobucci JJ, writing for the majority in Mills, went on to connect
the privacy/vulnerability cycle to equality in the context of compelled disclosure in court
proceedings:

When the boundary between privacy and full answer and defence is not properly
delineated, the equality of individuals whose lives are heavily documented is also
affected, as these individuals have more records that will be subject to wrongful scrutiny.
Karen Busby cautions that the use of records to challenge credibility at large

will subject those whose lives already have been subject to extensive
documentation to extraordinarily invasive review. This would include women
whose lives have been documented under conditions of multiple inequalities and
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institutionalization such as Aboriginal women, women with disabilities, or
women who have been imprisoned or involved with child welfare agencies.164

E.

Other Equality-Seeking Groups and the Privacy/Vulnerability Cycle

Although Canadian law involving young persons and sexual assault complainants more
consistently (but certainly not always) acknowledges the privacy/vulnerability cycle and its
connection to equality, there is at least a limited recognition of the cycle in relation to certain
other equality-seeking groups. This pattern is repeated in the human rights tribunal cases to which
we now turn.
As discussed in Part II.B.2. above, certain court and tribunal rules and procedures also
recognize and attempt to mitigate the “vicious cycle” of privacy loss and vulnerability, although
the rationale for defaulting in favour of access in some cases where clearly vulnerable community
members are involved and not in others involving equally vulnerable participants remains
unclear. Nonetheless, here we explore HRTO practices that suggest privacy/vulnerability
rationales for limiting access to records and/or proceedings.
As noted above, human rights proceedings, based as they are on claims related to social
locations that render individuals and groups vulnerable to discrimination, would seem to provide
classic examples of situations in which the privacy/vulnerability cycle is likely be at play. Many
human rights tribunals in Canada are authorized to preclude public access to hearings and to limit
access to their case files on a case-by-case basis.165 Hearings before the HRTO, for example, “are
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open to the public” unless the Tribunal orders otherwise,166 and all written decisions are publicly
available.167 The HRTO may order protection of the “confidentiality of personal or sensitive
information where it considers it appropriate to do so”, but unless otherwise ordered, in its
decisions it must use initials to identify children under 18 and the representative of children under
18 in the proceeding.168 HRTO’s practice direction states anonymization of decisions will only
happen in two circumstances: to protect children’s identity or in “exceptional circumstances”.169
As such, we again see a prioritization of children’s privacy.
MacDonnell’s analysis of HRTO decisions relating to requests for confidentiality suggest
that success in such cases is more likely for minors, applicants claiming sexual harassment,170 and
where a ban has issued in a related criminal case. Anonymization has also been ordered in a
handful of cases where the sexual orientation or gender identity of the applicant was in issue.171 In
contrast, confidentiality requests in cases involving claims related to race, ethnic origin, creed,
place of origin or ethnic origin, or which raised the issue of reprisal were unsuccessful, while
requests in cases involving disability produced mixed results.172 In a case decided after
MacDonnell’s analysis, a request on the basis of being a recipient of social assistance was
rejected.173
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The HRTO imposes a high standard for obtaining confidentiality with respect to
disability, notwithstanding social science evidence documenting the continuing stigma attached to
mental illness and the negative employment, insurance, parenting and other life repercussions that
can result from disclosure of mental illness.174 For example, in K v Northern Initiative for Social
Action, the HRTO concluded that “[a] general claim that there is still stigma associated with
mental illness is insufficient” to justify anonymization.175 In light of this approach, it seems
logical to suggest that those who prefer not to have their disabilities publicly disclosed in HRTO
decisions will be deterred from seeking relief,176 just as the Supreme Court of Canada in Bragg
found child victims of “online sexualized cyberbullying” were likely to be deterred from seeking
a legal remedy in the absence of some form of confidentiality.177 Deterring claims by those who
prefer not to disclose their disabilities arguably undermines their right to equal benefit and
protection of the law in the same way that disclosure of the identities of sexual assault
complainants without their consent triggers their equality rights, as found by the Supreme Court
of Canada in Mills.178
Notwithstanding concerns around HRTO practice in relation to disability and certain
other grounds of discrimination, in situations where the HRTO does decide to order
anonymization of its decisions, its reasons sometimes acknowledge the privacy/vulnerability
cycle. In GG v 1489024 Ontario Ltd, for example, the HRTO ordered anonymization in a case
involving allegations of sexual harassment.179 Although Adjudicator Whist noted that the mere
fact that “issues of a personal or sensitive nature” would not be enough to justify anonymization,
he concluded that the case fell “within one of the exceptional situations” where anonymization
was appropriate, citing a “risk of disclosure of highly sensitive information” in a case where the
174
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applicant had “already been subject to a sexual assault arising out of the facts that form the basis”
for her complaint.180

F.

The Privacy/Vulnerability Cycle and Online Court Records: Commentary and
Policy

Policymakers have also articulated concerns about the privacy/vulnerability cycle in considering
the implications of online accessibility of court records. In British Columbia, for example, the
Provincial Court issued a direction to prevent remote online access to non-conviction
information, stays of proceedings and peace bonds after specific periods of time.181 The direction
specifically refers to submissions filed as part of a public consultation on the issue that illustrate
the privacy/vulnerability cycle and unjust stigma arising from the use of non-conviction
information to judge individuals’ suitability for jobs and rental accommodation.182 Justice Bielby
of the Alberta Court of Queen’s Bench expressed similar concerns about allowing “ready public
access to the names of unconvicted accused” in Krushell, noting that:

[s]tatutorily prescribed punishments for the convicted would pale in many cases in
comparison to the de facto punishment created by posting [such] information… for the
benefit of the gossip and the busybody.183

In light of these concerns, the Court rejected an access to information request for disclosure of
daily court dockets by an applicant who proposed to post them on the internet. Additionally,
180
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courts in BC and Alberta have chosen not to post certain kinds of decisions on their websites,
such as those relating to family law, child protection and divorce,184 and, as noted above, family
court records are not publicly accessible on BC’s CSO.
The Office of the Privacy Commissioner of Canada (“OPC”) has also issued access
guidelines for federal tribunals governed by the Privacy Act185 with respect to addressing the
privacy/vulnerability cycle aggravated by online access to court records noting:

When personal information is made available on the Internet, individuals are at greater
risk of identity theft, stalkers, data profilers, data miners and discriminatory practices;
personal information can be taken out of context and used in illegitimate ways; and
individuals lose control over personal information they may well have legitimately
expected would be used for only limited purposes.186

Additionally, the OPC has questioned whether “the broad public needs to know the names of
individuals involved or requires access to intimate personal details through decisions posted
widely on the internet”,187 expressing the view that “the right to open courts does not outweigh
the right to privacy” so that both should exist in equilibrium.188 In line with these concerns, in
2008, the OPC recommended that Service Canada should either depersonalize or post only
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summaries of the Office of the Umpire decisions on the internet, noting that these appeals related
to personal information about employment insurance.189
Similarly, the Saskatchewan Information Privacy Commissioner (“IPC”) recommended
that the Automobile Injury Appeal Commission mask the identity of applicants before posting
their decisions online.190 Subsequently, the IPC’s 2004-5 annual report highlighted the connection
between online disclosure of personal and health information and “such problems as identity
theft, marketing opportunities, commercial data bases, personal safety of victims of domestic
violence and stalking”.191 Ultimately, the Commission adopted a policy of using initials in its
decisions.192
In 2005 the Canadian Judicial Council’s Judges Technology Advisory Committee issued
its Model Policy for Access to Court Records in Canada.193 That policy stated that it did not
endorse making all court records accessible online, and specifically adverted to the
privacy/vulnerability cycle, noting that “new technologies increase the risks that court
information might be used for improper purposes such as commercial data mining, identity theft,
stalking, harassment and discrimination”.194 It recommended, among other things, that courts
“prohibit the inclusion of unnecessary personal data identifiers and other personal information in
the court record” and that judges avoid disclosure of personal data identifiers and limit disclosure
of personal information in their judgments.195 It also recommended that judgments be made
available online, but that steps be taken to prevent indexing and cache storage by online bots, so
as to avoid searchability on general search engines like Google.196
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The privacy/vulnerability cycle and the special concerns it raises for members of
equality-seeking communities in the context of online court records is sometimes explicitly, but
more often implicitly, recognized in Canadian case law, legislation, court and tribunal rules and
procedures, as well as in commentary from privacy commissioners and policy makers. While
explicit reference to the cycle is more likely to surface in the context of specific vulnerable
populations, including young people and sexual assault complainants (who are disproportionately
likely to be women), it is occasionally also implicitly recognized in practices of anonymization in
relation to decision making about members of other equality-seeking communities. These
existing, albeit limited, acknowledgments of the privacy/vulnerability cycle, combined with
concerns about widespread online dissemination and increasingly sophisticated data profiling
techniques, provide a foundation and context ripe for reflecting on the relationship between
privacy and equality and for developing effective measures to intervene in the
privacy/vulnerability cycle.

IV.

Conclusion

Although privacy at law has been abused by members of privileged groups to the disadvantage of
less privileged groups, privacy, properly conceived, can also be intimately connected to
autonomy, self-determination and collective social rights and values, like equality.197 As Calo has
argued, members of marginalized communities are often accorded less privacy and subjected to
greater surveillance, which in turn exacerbates their exposure to further discrimination and
marginalization.198 The justice system frequently contributes to this “vicious cycle”, through the
over-representation of members of marginalized communities in court proceedings either against
their will or in order to contest or seek redress for the results of their marginalization. It need not,
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however, perpetuate the “vicious cycle” of privacy and vulnerability when it comes to public
access to court records. This has been recognized (albeit to a very limited degree) in the context
of certain vulnerable groups, particularly children and sexual assault complainants, as well as in
other privacy-based limits imposed in relation to litigation. And it need not, and should not,
perpetuate that “vicious cycle” in the context of online public access to court records.
Calo, in the epigraph, suggests that stronger protections for the chronically vulnerable
may be in order. While we agree with the logic and moral appeal of this argument, specifying
restrictions on online access to court records for chronically vulnerable communities raises at
least three problems. First, identification of the “chronically vulnerable” seems to necessitate
creation of hierarchies of vulnerability that, in light of the multiplicity of matrices of domination
at play in the world,199 may neither be equality-enhancing or possible to do. Second, the
identification process would have to be an ongoing one as the sources and grounds and
intersections of vulnerability due to social location shift and reshape themselves. This would
inevitably seem to leave certain marginalized communities vulnerable and exposed until such
time as their plight was recognized by the courts and incorporated into some form of privacyprotective, equality-enhancing measure. Third, as MacDonnell has pointed out, automatic
“protections” for certain marginalized groups could serve to reinforce the stereotypes and
discrimination against which they are intended to push back200 by uniquely depriving members of
those groups the autonomy to determine whether they wish to conceal that information about
themselves.
For these reasons, and recognizing that there is no perfect solution, we return to the
recommendation we put forward as a result of a prior analysis that specifically focused on the
privacy issues relating to online public access to unredacted court records.201 There we proposed
maintaining public access to court records in its current form (and subject to whatever limitations
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laws that rein in the open court principle allow), while “introducing appropriate ‘friction’ in the
process of accessing court records” online.202 This could include redacting personal information
from court records (including anonymizing judgments) before they are made accessible online,
restricting search visibility and protecting access to documents.203
We recognize that this response goes further than necessary to intervene specifically on
the privacy/vulnerability cycle because it provides a level of obscurity for both those who are
members of equality-seeking groups and those who are not. However, it offers two attractive
outcomes. First, it does not presume that members of certain marginalized communities must
want to conceal information about themselves because it is necessarily stigmatizing or something
to be ashamed of. Instead it assumes that a certain level of concealment is important to the dignity
of all persons in the context of easy and widespread access to digital records. Second, in making
that assumption, it removes the costly onus of bringing a motion to displace a presumption of
openness in a proceeding from the shoulders of a party seeking privacy protection. This aspect of
our proposed response could be of particular benefit to individuals from marginalized
communities who are unaware of the possibility of seeking such protections and/or who are not in
a financial position to press for them before a court or tribunal.
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